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ABSTRACT 
This article outlines the ‘reverse discourses’ of black, African-American and Afro-
Caribbean comedians in the UK and USA. These reverse discourses appear in comic 
acts that employ the sign-systems of embodied and cultural racism but develop, or 
seek to develop, a reverse semantic effect. I argue the humour of reverse discourse is 
significant in relation to racism because it forms a type of resistance that can, first, act 
rhetorically against racist meaning and so attack racist truth claims and points of 
ambivalence. Second, and connected to this, it can rhetorically resolve the ambiguity 
of the reverse discourse itself. Alongside this, and paradoxically, reverse discourses 
also contain a polysemic element that can, at times, reproduce racism. The article 
seeks to develop a means of analysing the relationship between racist and non-racist 
meaning in such comedic performance. 
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Introduction 
The article offers a basic typology of black, African-American and Afro-Caribbean 
comedy as a form of reverse discourse. This typology is constructed by showing some 
key rhetorical devices through which racial stereotypes are employed and attacked in 
comedy, and the potential influence that particular reverse discourses might have on 
both the ambivalences of racism and the ambivalences of anti-racism. 
 
The article defines ‘reverse discourse’, before connecting the definition with the 
existing literature that theorizes humour as an expression of resistance or as a counter 
discourse. I outline the reverse discourses produced by black comedians, before 
giving an analysis of the use of ‘nigga’, a derivative of the racist epithet ‘nigger’, in 
the reversal of embodied racism. Overall, it is noted that the most successful 
responses to racism come from American rather than British comedians, and the key 
differences are outlined.  
 
Reversal and Resistance: An Effective Counterstrategy? 
Reverse humour is principally a discourse or an element of a discourse whose 
etymology can be traced, often in a quite evident manner, to an earlier discourse that 
uses identical signs but which employs these signs for a reverse semantic effect. It is a 
discourse that is produced, situated and directed in clear opposition to the racist 
meaning of the earlier discourse. 
 
This reverse semantic focus or change of ‘direction’ is created by a change in the 
social dynamics of the speaker, and the audience or reader, which amounts to a 
change of context. The article discusses humour that is ostensibly comparable to racist 
humour, but differs, primarily, because it is the ‘other’ of the earlier discourse who 
articulates it, inflects meaning, and is often the preferred reader of the text. One 
consequence of this contextual shift is that debates are often provoked over the 
denotative meaning of the text vis-a-vis its racist connotations. 
This is because, while in any linguistic utterance the preferred meaning of the speaker 
cannot be guaranteed, in a reverse discourse the antagonism between the potential 
readings often increases its polysemic potential. Such interactions or discursive 
confrontations may not produce a ‘winner’ or be ‘successful’, and polysemic 
expression may form the outcome of the utterance, thus leading to the simultaneous 
existence of the earlier and reversed meaning from a single utterance. ‘Success’ in this 
humour (which is unpacked later in the article) refers not just to the generation of 
laughter but also, on the one hand, to the perceived impact on anti-racist discourse 
vis-a-vis intentionality, and on the other hand, to any connotations provoked vis-a-vis 
racist ideology.  
 
The problem of polysemic meaning is confronted in some studies although most do 
not evaluate the racist potential of reverse discourse. Berger (1998) suggests of this 
type of ethnic comedy that ‘the situation is always perilous, for the comedians always 
face the risk of being thought of as ashamed of their racial or ethnic identity’ (1998: 
70). Berger’s analysis does not develop a description of the potential effects of the 
humour, so while he may articulate one concern that the comedian may have, a 
consideration of the way in which the comedian might support various racist 
meanings is missing. Malik (2002) provides an alternative approach to the analysis of 
reversed ethnic comedy and both acknowledges and questions the use of race and 
ethnic stereotypes in humour. She articulates the dilemma in relation to black clown 
stereotypes: 
The central question has always been one of whether images of  
Blackness in television comedy ‘play on’ or ‘play off’ the long-
established Black clown stereotype, and whether we are being invited to 
laugh with or at the Black comic entertainer. (2002: 92, original 
emphasis) 
 
While Malik does explain this as a problem with multi-faceted considerations, she 
does not undertake any mapping of meaning or begin to elicit the presence of racism 
in polysemic discourse. By focusing on what we are being invited to laugh at, Malik 
points towards the preferred meaning of the text as central for identifying a particular 
instance of racist meaning. This should not be the focus of a consideration of meaning 
in a reverse discourse. Malik’s articulation of a dichotomy between the direction of 
laughter as one ‘with’ or ‘at’ the ‘other’ is false – because it does not prioritize the 
polysemic nature of these discourses – and can be reframed. Instead, reverse comedy 
should be approached by arguing that while we may see the presentation of the 
reversed voice of the ‘other’ as the preferred meaning, there is a prior reliance on the 
sign-systems of earlier racism. These earlier meanings have the potential to re-
emerge, gain purchase and act rhetorically. Any evaluation of a reverse discourse 
should, therefore, be rephrased as a consideration of how the images in humour both 
simultaneously ‘play on’ and ‘play off’ the long-established stereotypes. We should 
begin with an acceptance of the polysemic structure of the discourse and remove any 
overemphasis on the intentionality of the speaker, thus beginning from the position of 
the discourse as having a simultaneous, and paradoxical, racist and anti-racist 
potential.  
 
Hewitt (1986) provides a nuanced description of the complexities of reversal 
processes with examples of racial stereotypes in adolescent humour. These inter-racial 
friendships were replete with ‘racist’ humour, which formed a ritual for dealing with 
racist ideology in society (p. 236) and ‘transformed [racism] into a plaything, in an 
attempt to acknowledge its social presence while rendering it meaningless’ (p. 237). 
The polysemicity of this humour represents its transformation into ‘commonsense’ 
anti-racist critique. Back (1996) details similar interactions between adolescents that 
form a ‘micro-critique’ of racism that reverses meaning (p. 178). He explains how ‘on 
the one side of this line is the meaning that the word … stands for in wider usage, on 
the other is a meaningless denotation guaranteed in play’ (p. 74). It is worth noting 
that media comedy might be more prone to multiple meanings than micro instances, 
and in the examples that follow I give analysis of why certain reversals might be more 
‘successful’ than others. Before that though, it is necessary to give a clear definition 
of comic meaning. 
 
In defining this form of comic meaning, it is important to emphasize that the multiple 
meanings generated by the reverse comic discourse represent forms of sign-slippage 
via appropriation. Preceding this, sign-slippage as incongruity is a necessary 
constituent in all humour, which is structurally similar to metaphor and other 
rhetorical devices (Eco, 1986: 272; Dorfles, in Attardo, 1994: 176). Bateson (1972) 
describes the linguistic movement in play or parody as one that creates meta-
communication. This is synonymous with non-literal meaning. Meta-communication 
represents a metaphorical frame where a denotive meaning can be reversed or 
changed. Fry describes this as essential for humour – he argues that ‘[i]nescapably the 
punch line combines communication and meta-communication’ (Fry, 1963: 158, in 
Berger, 1998: 5). Through textual analysis, meta-communication can be shown to 
contain a wide range of rhetorical devices that structure the humorous expression. I 
use Berger’s list of comic rhetorical devices (see Appendix one) to describe the tropes 
that structure particular jokes, or the form of meta-communication that the jokes 
develop.  
 
In a reverse comic discourse a further semantic layer is added to the basic rhetorical 
structure of humour. While racist sign-systems can be reversed in serious 
communication and this forms appropriation, the placing of reversal in a comic 
incongruity increases the structural potential for generating semantic movement. The 
additional layering complicates the interaction between anti-racist meaning, racist 
meaning and the rhetorical effect of humour. 
 
Humour as Resistance 
The idea that humour and mockery can form resistance is a popular theme in humour 
studies. Early superiority theorists acknowledged it and sought to control the 
subversive potential of ridicule and mockery when it was directed at those in power. 
A notable example of the theorization of humour as resistance appears in Bakhtin’s 
description of the carnival culture of the Middle Ages. Gurevich argues that Bakhtin 
‘stressed that at the heart of carnival was the idea of overturning reality, the tradition 
of turning the established social and religious order upside down’ (Gurevich, 1997: 
57). Contemporary studies provide examples of humour acting as a form of resistance 
in numerous situations (e.g. Benton, 1988; Dundes and Hauschild, 1988; Linstead, 
1988; Rodrigues and Collinson, 1995). An illuminating example appears in Bryant 
(2006), who describes how humour was used as a form of resistance by Czech 
nationals under Nazi occupation (see Stokker, 2001, for similar examples in Norway). 
Importantly, and although only implicitly highlighted by Bryant, a part of the function 
of this resistance humour was the resolution of an ambivalence, through the 
presentation of the resistance movement as unambiguously united. This example is 
worth examining in more detail. 
 
Bryant describes jokes as an ideal form of symbolic resistance because, ‘[o]vert, 
easily translated political statements could lead to trouble, but jokes were too 
nebulous, too slippery to get one arrested. Jokes, with their ironic tones and 
ambiguous messages, flew underneath the radar of the Nazi authorities’ (2006: 140). 
He also describes the existence of ambivalence in the social situation where resistance 
humour emerged. In Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia, ‘ambiguity and uncertainty… 
constituted the essence of everyday life for most Protectorate inhabitants’ (p. 136). He 
goes on: ‘Rather than clearly staking out a Czech or anti-Reich position, Protectorate 
inhabitants were often befuddled by the greys’ (p. 149). Existence in Nazi-held 
Czechoslovakia was, therefore, not constituted by an unambivalent, unchanging 
resistance to Nazi occupation. Bryant theorizes the function of resistance joke telling 
as a ‘safety valve’, or ‘a harmless vent that allowed Czechs to continue working in 
factories while maintaining a vague sense of patriotism and integrity’ (p. 148). He 
explains that the ‘[j]okes were also a way of coping, staving off despair and 
attempting to come to terms with a world that lacked order and clarity’ (p. 149). His 
comments suggest that a significant connection existed between the jokes acting as a 
safety valve and the ambivalence or lack of order in the society in which they were 
told.  
 
Bauman (1991) describes order-building as the major concern of modernity, and 
order-building discourse as its product. I propose that joking is one way of resolving 
the semantic side-effect of order-building, which is, for Bauman, the creation of 
ambivalence (Weaver, 2007). Jokes require ambiguity or incongruity as content, and, 
as a rhetorical device that is similar to metaphor, have the inbuilt ability to have an 
impact on truth perceptions (and the perception of ambivalence), all paradoxically in a 
non-serious discursive realm. Hewitt (1986) and Back’s (1996) individual discussions 
of adolescent anti-racist humour fit this argument. The humour of inter-racial 
friendships can be seen to mediate the ambiguity of the discourses of friendship and 
racist ideology. Tropes are employed here to manipulate meaning and render racist 
ideology meaningless (1996: 74). 
 
Returning to Bryant, in Nazi-held Czechoslovakia a connection existed between the 
emergence of the humour and the ambivalence of the social situation for the 
Protectorate inhabitants, and humour helped to resolve this ambivalence. Evidence of 
this is strengthened because Bryant argues that the jokes were often transmitted from 
Czech resistance fighters to the government in exile in London, where the 
presentation of a particular unambiguous discourse of resistance would have been 
preferable. Although Bryant does not make the specific connection between the 
emergence of the resistance jokes and the ambiguity and angst that he describes in the 
social situation, this ambiguity would, no doubt, have proved a hindrance for the 
presentational aims of the resistance movement.  
 
The Reverse Discourse and Resistance of Black Comics 
This section begins with an outline of the historical scope of black performance that is 
included in the category of reverse comic performance. Reverse discourse constitutes 
a type of performance whose appearance cannot be simplistically ascribed to a 
particular social situation or historical period; rather, it is both as old as black 
performance and the race stereotypes that it works against. Because of this, discourses 
of reversal are not specific to post-colonial societies (cf. Malik, 2002). 
 
Cantwell (1992) outlines two tropes that dominated African-American minstrel 
performance and encouraged an explosion of stereotypes through humour (p. 271). 
Black performers would, first, through the trope of hyperbole, ‘parody the parody 
itself … and rise above the stereotype’ (1992, original emphasis). Sotiropoulos adds:  
 
Black entertainers consciously used racist stereotypes in their 
performances in part to distance themselves from these images … they 
were performing these roles, not embracing them as representative 
behaviour. (2006: 9, original emphasis)  
 
Second, through burlesque (Cantwell, 1992: 270), performers would juxtapose 
opposites, which included the opposite of ‘negritude’, and thus the potential for the 
reversal of such racism. For example, early 20th-century black resistance appeared in 
the work of minstrel comedians Bert Williams and Ernest Hogan. These performers 
‘celebrated black communities, denounced Jim Crow, and critiqued black elite 
pretension – all behind the minstrel mask’ (Sotiropoulos, 2006: 4). Paradoxically, 
their acts also perpetuated popular racist stereotypes of black people, which had to be 
a part of the content for them to be allowed to perform at all. This polysemicity was 
noted: 
 
… white critics were particularly attentive to moments when black 
audiences in the balcony laughed but whites remained silent. These 
moments made all too clear that black performers had told jokes that went 
literally and figuratively over the heads of their white audiences. (2006: 6) 
 
Williams and Hogan actively played up to race stereotypes for the white members of 
the audience, while offering alternative meanings for the segregated black audience 
confined to the balcony above them. Importantly, as long as the white audience kept 
on laughing at the presentation of basic stereotypes, the performance, which contained 
resistance, would also have created a monosemic racist laugh, although we should not 
underplay the extent to which the white audience may have appreciated the polysemic 
aspects of the performance as well.  
 
There are many examples in turn of the century black US entertainment. Billy 
Kersands’ blackface song Old Aunt Jemima, whose protagonist subsequently became 
the stereotyped face of a flour company, was originally intended to work against 
stereotype, not create one (Sotiropoulos, 2006: 22). In Bandana Land, Williams and 
Walker ‘addressed segregated public space, white racist stereotyping, and African 
American exploitation of stereotypes for economic gain – themes that went 
unmentioned in the white reviews’ (p. 66). Billy Johnson’s song No Coons Allowed 
followed a favoured style of black songwriters who ‘addressed African American 
audiences with the verse and white publishers and audiences with the chorus’ (p. 95). 
These performers both critiqued and conformed to stereotypes and thus appealed to 
white and black audiences. Later 20th-century black and Jewish performance would 
continue this. While beyond the scope of this article, Lenny Bruce’s reversal of 
‘nigger’, Woody Allen and Rodney Dangerfield on anti-Semitism, Mel Brooks on 
fascism and racism, and Flip Wilson’s carnivalization of race stereotypes, all deserve 
analysis as reverse discourse. 
 
Black Responses to Embodied Racism 
Embodied racism is the term I use to describe the contemporary remnants of 
biological racism (see St Louis, 2003: 76, for a similar use of the term). An example 
of a typically modern and ambivalent discourse, it can be defined as racism that 
focuses on parts of the body but does not necessarily reproduce the discourses of 
biological racism in their totality or severity. In current sociology, embodied racism 
receives little attention, in favour of an emphasis on cultural racism as the dominant 
post-colonial form. This under-emphasis has led to an analytical blind spot that, in 
many cases, has failed to describe racism as not just the interconnection of embodied 
and cultural racism, but as an internally muddled and erratic set of ideas and practices. 
The separation of embodied and cultural racism in this article aims to highlight 
embodied racism and to show its connection to and contextual overlap with cultural 
racism, rather than to exaggerate their distinctiveness or downplay the impact of one 
or the other racist form. Thus the dichotomy is used here to flag up embodied racism 
and could be open to more complex readings. 
 
Two examples of reversed embodied racism in humour are examined. The first is a 
reversal of the savagery/civilization dichotomy often constructed in embodied racism. 
This reversal was epitomized by the hugely influential African-American comedian, 
the late Richard Pryor. The second is a reversal of race sex stereotypes that also 
connect with this dichotomy as a specific subsection. This example is highlighted in 
the comedy of Reginald D. Hunter, a US-born comedian who performs stand-up in 
the UK. These examples are shown to have varying levels of success as forms of 
resistance and reversal, principally because of their complexity. 
 
Pryor’s critical comments on both US racial and cultural issues lead many to cite him 
as one of the most influential black performers of the post-civil rights era. The 
recognition and controversy he provoked as a comedian relates not just to his ability 
to make audiences laugh, but is indicative of the content and the context of the 
material, which is connected to his resistance to racism and to the rhetoric of his 
comedy in attacking the ambiguity of that racism. This is exemplified in his diversion 
of one of the central dichotomies of embodied racism – civilization/nature – which 
describes the ‘other’ as savage or corporeal in comparison to the civilized white 
European. Pryor enacts this diversion through a comic trope that matches Bergson’s 
idea of the comic as ‘[s]omething mechanical encrusted on the living’ (1911: 39). 
 
Bergson argued that laughter would result if a human appears mechanized: ‘The 
attitudes, gestures and movements of the human body are laughable in exact 
proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine’ (1911: 32). While ultimately 
incomplete as the universal theory of laughter that it was intended to be, and 
connected to his wider philosophical outlook that saw problems and dangers in a 
mechanized society, specifically as a break in ‘duration’, Bergson’s idea is 
acknowledged as an explanation of one specific comic trope (see Appendix one). 
Pryor’s comedy uses this trope effectively by depicting white Americans, in 
accordance with the racist dichotomy, as civilized but also as repressed and 
mechanized. African-Americans are depicted as natural, expressive and able to enjoy 
the basic pleasures of existence. The reversal is used throughout his performances. 
Pryor (2004) describes the difference between whites and blacks eating dinner. White 
people are depicted as not making any noise when they eat – in a civilized, orderly 
manner but also in a robotic style – whereas blacks are depicted as eating loudly and 
expressing enjoyment. The metaphor is extended to portray the mechanical, 
unemotional voice of the white American, to Pryor’s enjoyment of picking his nose 
and farting, and to comparisons of black and white woman menstruating (2004). The 
reversal is also used to describe a white machine-like denial of pleasure, especially of 
sexual pleasure. Pryor explains that ‘white folks don’t cum, that’s why they fuck quiet 
… niggas make noise when they cum’ (2004). His continued articulation and 
redirection of the civilization/nature dichotomy creates the image of the white 
American existence as incomplete, thus situating his comedy in opposition to one of 
the central tenets of the embodied racism aimed at black people. While we could 
argue that Pryor, through reusing racial categories, leaves the basis of racism 
undisturbed, he does provide a key site of reversal and resistance to the 
civilization/nature dichotomy and encourages its ambivalence through this 
disturbance, thus offering a rhetorical redefinition of reality. 
 
A second example of resistance to embodied racism appears in the comedy of 
Reginald D. Hunter. In a recent show entitled White Woman, Hunter concentrates on 
the subject of inter-racial sex and miscegenation, which is a recurring concern in 
embodied racism and a specific subsection of the civilization/nature dichotomy. 
Hunter says:  
 
I remember the first time an English white woman asked me out, I 
reacted like a runaway slave. ‘Would you like to come out with me for 
a drink?’ ‘Girl you better shut your mouth, shit woman you gonna get 
both us killed.’ (2005) 
 
Drawing on racist ideas of the prohibition of miscegenation, specifically from the 
US context, and the ‘impact’ of that on Hunter’s identity, the joke attempts to transfer 
the material into a British context. This forms an incongruity through comparison and 
stereotype – which are comic tropes (see Appendix one). However, the extent to 
which the joke reverses racism is questionable, as a racist reading could assert the 
idea of the black man out of context as an example of him lacking civility or 
adaptation. 
 
At present, Hunter’s comedy, of which this is just an extract, does not develop the 
complexity or interconnectedness that appears in Pryor’s work. While Hunter 
addresses racial stereotyping (Rampton, 2005) and violence against women, his work, 
as yet, does not possess the strong themes of reversal shown by others, and appears 
more obviously polysemic than that of Pryor’s. So, for example, he has been known 
to begin a monologue by asking the audience, ‘[a]ny woman here ever been beaten up 
by a man?’ (Logan, 2005). The use of such material always runs the risk of invoking 
racial stereotypes of savagery and sexual violence, and if it is to act as a form of 
reversal it needs to be situated in a specific relationship to racism, in which mockery 
rather than affirmation of the dichotomy becomes the most obvious meaning. 
Reversed meanings have a polysemic potential that can rearticulate the earlier racist 
meaning, and Hunter has been accused of this; The Times comedy critic Alex 
O’Connell has charged him with being ‘flagrantly misogynistic and enforcing racial 
stereotypes of black people’ (Gibbons, 2003). 
 
Black Responses to Cultural Racism 
The dominant discursive form describes cultural racism as the significant mode of 
racism in contemporary British society (Modood, 1997, 2005). Sociologists have used 
a number of terms to describe cultural racism, all of which emphasize either a 
particular characteristic or a particular point of emergence. Early usage of the term 
appears in Fanon (1967), to describe the dominant form of colonial racism. It was 
labelled ‘new racism’ by Barker (1981) because of its supposed newness in relation to 
biological racism, which he argued it had replaced. The ‘neo racism’ of Balibar 
(1991) represents the French nomenclature and describes a similar phenomenon. A 
return to Fanon’s terminology appears in Modood’s work, principally because he 
views cultural racism as something that is not particularly new and suggests it has 
existed for as long as, if not longer than, processes of immigration (1997: 155). The 
label ‘differentialist racism’ also appears in some accounts and highlights that cultural 
difference is of principal concern in cultural racism, rather than the hierarchy of 
difference evident in traditional racisms. All accounts describe a racism that 
discriminates on the basis of cultural difference rather than race difference and so 
implies that ‘culture can also function like a nature’ (Balibar, 1991: 22, original 
emphasis). Because of its emphasis on culture, it is often seen as a racism that moves 
away from, or disguises a belief in, a biological basis to racism. 
 
Modood suggests that cultural racism is directed at Asian ethnic groups, while black 
and Afro-Caribbean people are principally affected by embodied racism (1997: 156–
60). Nevertheless, black comedians do respond to cultural racism too. In line with the 
responses to embodied racism presented here, these examples emphasize reversal and 
work to attack some of the inherent ambivalences of cultural racism. 
 
In Live and Unleashed (1989) Lenny Henry presents examples that reverse cultural 
racism, most of which highlight and subvert stereotypical depictions of language use, 
mannerisms and dispositions between ethnic groups (see also Henry and Fuller, 1994, 
for similar examples):  
 
People react to blackness in different ways. I had a friend called Dave 
who was a white guy and he really wanted to be black. With his whole 
heart, Dave wanted to be black. All his friends were black, he had a black 
girlfriend, he knew all the words to the Bob Marley records, we’re 
talking commitment here. We were so different, I’d go round to his 
house, knock, knock, ‘Dave, coming out for a game of football’ [said 
with a Dudley accent]. ‘Well Len, my woman just put in a pot of chicken 
and some rice. I feel like I just want to rest tonight. Easy Lenny’ [said 
with a stereotypical West Indian accent]. I’d say ‘alright dude’. I had a 
lot of white friends. I don’t mind, they could hangout with me. They’d be 
out stealing hubcaps otherwise, you know what they’re like, give them a 
break I say. (Henry in Henry and Fuller, 1989) 
 
Henry directly reverses stereotypes of black linguistic competence and criminality. 
First, he gives a fairly straightforward and gentle mockery of cultural and racist 
stereotypes, by highlighting in the joke content that not all black people, or white 
people for that matter, speak in a prescribed fashion. In the second section of the joke 
a similar technique is used towards cultural stereotypes of black criminality (this is a 
recurring theme in Henry’s comedy; see Fuller, 1983a, 1983b; Henry and Fuller, 
1989, 1994). This represents an explicit reversal of a dichotomy, rather than the 
deviation we saw in Pryor’s work. Reversal is outlined by Berger as one rhetorical 
device that can structure humour (see Appendix one). While Henry attempts to show 
the absurdity of such stereotypes through this technique, and attacks the content of 
cultural racism, the examples do not remove the polysemic potential in the discourse 
and the jokes could also support the earlier stereotype. In the first example a racist 
reading might mock white men who choose a ‘lesser’ racial group or culture with 
which to identify. In the second, the reversal might simply be taken as an absurdity, 
rather than seeing the absurdity in the original stereotype of black criminality. Thus 
the rhetorical potential is ambiguous. 
 
Henry’s comedy is not as deliberately brash or vulgar as a great deal of African-
American comedy and is generally aimed at a mainstream, family audience. It 
therefore only develops quite mild reversals of cultural racism and comment on ethno-
cultural hybridity. My next example, from the stand-up comedy of the US comedian 
Chris Rock, attacks culturally racist attitudes to speech in a very different way. 
 
Rock’s comedy deals uncompromisingly with American race and ethnic relations, and 
racism, providing many examples of reverse discourse. What follows shows Rock 
resisting and attacking white racist attitudes to black vernacular and linguistic 
competence, through mimicking and mocking comments directed at Colin Powell: 
 
Colin Powell can’t be president … whenever Colin Powell’s on the news 
white people always give him the same compliments, always the same 
compliments, ‘How do you feel about Colin Powell?’ ‘He speaks so ell’, 
‘he’s so well spoken’, ‘he speaks so well’, ‘I mean, he really speaks 
well’, ‘he speaks so well’. Like that’s a compliment! Speaks so well’s not 
a compliment okay, speaks so well’s some shit you say about retarded 
people that can talk. What do you mean he speaks so well?… He’s a 
fucking educated man, how the fuck do you expect him to sound? You 
dirty motherfuckers, what’re you talking about? ‘Speaks so well’, what 
you talking about, ‘he speaks so well’. What voice were you looking to 
come out of his mouth? What the fuck did you expect him to sound like? 
‘I’m gonna drop me a bomb ta-day, I be pres-o-dent’, get the fuck out of 
here. (Rock, 1996) 
 
Rock performs all of his comedy and film roles with a characteristic and caricatured 
shriek that gives his voice an added impression of contempt that is not transferred in 
the text. In discussing white attitudes to Powell, Rock uses repetition and hyperbole, 
which are included in Berger’s list of comic tropes (see Appendix one), to unpack 
culturally racist views of black speech. Through the comparison of the white 
‘compliment’ and typical comments about the ‘retarded’, Rock is able to construct a 
very effective incongruity. This incongruity is strengthened by the context Rock 
develops, and it is because of his outright mockery of white racist attitudes that the 
chance of reasserting the racist stereotype – or the chance of polysemic meaning – is 
reduced. A racist reading would need to distance itself completely from Rock’s 
preferred meaning, perhaps by concentrating on the final line of the quote, which 
impersonates the stereotypical depiction of Powell. The extent that Rock, and Pryor, 
use techniques to stretch the incongruity, so that the stereotypes are pushed away from 
the racist habitus in which they emerge, creates far more effective reversal and 
resistance humour, which is perhaps why they are recognized as two of the most 
significant black US stand-up comedians vis-a-vis their specific stance on racism. 
This is something that is not achieved in the British comedy of Hunter and Henry, but 
is also framed by the specific context of black resistance to US race relations in the 
post-civil rights era. 
 
The Use of ‘Nigga’ in Reverse Discourses 
‘Nigger’ is one of, if not the, most offensive of racist epithets. The word can be 
described as a ‘master signifier’ and as a means of denoting a history of oppression 
and violence, suggesting its denotive capacity is relatively fixed because of this racist 
history. That said, as with all words, its context of utterance still has an impact on the 
meaning that is generated (for a similar discussion see Billig, 2005: 31). 
 
The use of ‘nigger’ and its polysemicity has been described in the ethnographic 
literature. Hewitt outlines how ‘nigger’ can be used to undermine racist categories and 
ideology (1986: 227). Giving an example of one white youth using it on another to 
undermine the latter’s racist attitudes, he argues that it need not signify ‘anything 
beyond itself about ideas, attitudes and practices with respect to race’ (1986: 232, 
original emphasis). Back gives examples of its use between young black people as a 
part of a cultural code for subverting race stereotypes (1996: 117), and Hartigan 
describes how ‘whites and blacks [in Detroit] use “nigger” with a number of 
inflections and a range of purposes’ (1999: 112). ‘Nigger’ was used by whites in 
Detroit with starkly racist meanings but also in ways that mimic convivial uses among 
black people. Such examples follow Butler’s comment that its use can be ‘both 
forceful and arbitrary, recalcitrant and open to reuse’ (Butler, 1997: 100, in Hartigan, 
1999: 113).  
 
Attempts at appropriation often involve the use of the word ‘nigga’ rather than 
‘nigger’, which helps create a paradigmatic separation from the term ‘nigger’ and set 
up the potential for this new line of connotation. The word ‘nigga’ is used in film 
dialogue and hip hop lyrics, and has been described equally as a positive and 
pernicious expression. The word and debates on its use also appear in, and around, 
various instances of humour.  
 
I examine its potential as a form of resistance to the literal meaning of ‘nigger’, other 
inflections of meaning, and any racist meanings that are rearticulated by the use of the 
word. This is a discussion of its polysemicity, of the successes and failures of its 
expropriation. The term is used extensively in African-American stand-up comedy, so 
I will take two well-known examples from Pryor and Rock and outline the differences 
in use. Rock uses the word in Bring the Pain (1996) to distinguish between types of 
black people:  
 
Now we’ve got a lot of things, a lot of racism going on in the world, 
who’s more racist? Black people or white people? Black people, you 
know why? Because we hate black people too. Everything white people 
don’t like about black people, black people really don’t like about black 
people. There’s some shit going on with black people, there’s like a civil 
war going on with black people and there’s two sides, there’s black 
people and there’s niggas, and niggas have got to go. Every time black 
people want to have a good time, ignorant ass niggas fuck it up. You 
can’t do shit, you can’t do shit without some ignorant assed nigga 
fucking it up, can’t do nothing, can’t keep a disco open more than three 
weeks, ‘grand opening’, ‘grand closing’. Can’t go to a movie the first 
week it comes out, why? Because niggas are shooting at the screen, what 
kind of ignorant shit is that? ‘It’s a good movie, it’s so good I gotta bust a 
cap in here.’ Hey I love black people but I hate niggas, oh I hate niggas, 
boy I wish they’d let me join the Ku Klux Klan, shit, I’d do a drive-by 
from here to Brooklyn. 
 
In embodied racism, ‘nigger’ is used to depict the black man as subhuman, as 
representing the ‘other’ that exists at the negative pole of all racist dichotomies. It is, 
therefore, always used in racism to construct the ‘nigger’ in relation to something that 
is more human, more civilized, to something that has a greater social worth. Rock, in 
this example, is using the term ‘nigga’ (although the pronunciation does not allow for 
a clear distinction), to construct a difference between normal or respectable, and anti-
social or ignorant, black people. This represents the key paradigmatic construction in 
this text, which is voiced as the dichotomy between ‘black people’ and ‘niggas’. 
Importantly, the construct created is a dichotomy between the moral and the immoral. 
Rock is describing an element of the black community that is involved in crime and 
anti-social behaviour, that lets the rest down. While Rock is creating a distinction 
between his use of ‘nigga’ and a racist use of ‘nigger’, because the latter would, in all 
likelihood, not want to make a conscious separation of African-Americans into two 
groups, there are key connections between his use of the term and the racist meaning 
of ‘nigger’. While racisms often assert universal dichotomies, techniques can be used 
that excuse the ambiguity of these dichotomies. Often techniques excuse or 
particularize some of the ‘others’ as not ‘other’, as acceptable and ‘not like the rest’. 
Rock’s example divides African-Americans into ‘black people’ and ‘niggas’, and 
while Rock may say rightly so (see below) this has the effect of producing the 
rhetorical/comic expression of an important racist ambivalence, which is the 
negotiation of acceptable and unacceptable ‘others’ in the context of an overarching 
racism. Rock’s group splitting is a common practice not specific to racial 
categorization; what makes it distinctive is that it maps onto racist ambivalence 
management. The extract therefore contains the double meanings of early minstrel 
performance that attracted both white and black audiences. 
 
In an interview with Nelson George, Rock gives some explanation of the joke. A part 
of the explanation of the joke relies on its perceived truth value:  
 
CR: I didn’t think about it in political terms, I never think about the stuff 
in political terms. I think about it, it’s funny, is it funny … A lot of times 
I’d do press and um, you know, especially white journalists, and I guess 
some black journalists too, ‘how does a black audience feel about the 
niggas and black part’, and I’m like ‘watch the special’, it’s a whole 
black audience... Thank god I came up in this era of video and DVD and 
everything so it’s there, there’s no misinterpretation of it. Where, you 
know, Lenny Bruce, if I’d done the same routine in the ’50s. I probably 
couldn’t have walked through Harlem because it would be all 
misconstrued. You know what I mean? It would have been taken all out 
of context.  
NG: Why do you think that white people like it so much? That’s always 
the big bone of contention, ‘Well they like it so much’, so it can’t be, 
there must be something wrong. 
CR: I don’t know everyone’s got it, you know everyone’s got their own 
version of it in their, you know, Italians have their version of it, Jewish 
people have their own version of it. I definitely know gay people who go 
‘I’m gay, but I hate faggots’. I’ve heard that, you know what I mean, 
everyone’s got their version of it... Hey it’s good for me … but people 
politicised it more than it maybe should have been, you know it’s just 
jokes man. (Rock and George, 1996) 
 
In Rock’s comments we can see the simultaneous assertion that the statement that 
‘black people’ and ‘niggas’ exist has a truthful value to it and that it is not a political 
statement because ‘it’s just jokes man’ – that it is not serious – all in a comic 
incongruity that can generate rhetorical meaning around the ‘truthful’ reading of the 
discourse. While Rock’s comments are not unexpected, the comedian may not be best 
placed to comment on the polysemicity of humour, being so attached to intentionality. 
Racist meaning is generated despite the intentionality of the comic rather than because 
of it. Polysemicity is exhibited as the statement reflects a splitting of the black 
community, resonates with the splitting of any community, and negotiates racist 
ambivalence – all from the single utterance. 
 
It has been suggested that Pryor was one of the first black performers to attempt 
appropriation of ‘nigga’ and ‘nigger’ (Cook, 2004). In his earlier comedy he uses the 
term frequently and indeterminately. In an interview he once said of this, ‘one day I 
said “Hello, I’m Richard Pryor, I’m a nigger”. I wanted to take the sting out of it. 
Nigger. Nigger. Nigger. It was the truth and it made me feel free to say it’ (Pryor in 
Sullivan, 2005). Pryor’s approach adheres to the general philosophy that the meaning 
of terminology can be wrestled with and redefined, but does not consider the re-
articulation of earlier racist meaning. Despite this initial stance, Pryor famously 
changed his mind on the use of ‘nigga’ following a trip to Africa: 
 
One thing I got out of it was magic I’d like to share with you. I was 
leaving and I was sitting in the hotel and a voice said to me, said ‘look 
around, what do you see?’ And I said ‘I see all colours of people doing 
everything’, and the voice said ‘Do you see any niggas?’ And I said 
‘no’, and said ‘you know why? Cos there ain’t any’, and it hit me like a 
shot man. I started crying and shit. I was sitting there and I said ‘I’ve 
been here three weeks and I haven’t even said it, I haven’t even thought 
it’, and it made me say ‘oh my god, I’ve been wrong, I’ve been wrong, 
I’ve got to regroup my shit. I ain’t never gonna call another black man a 
nigga’. You know cos we never was no niggas, that’s a word that’s used 
to describe our own wretchedness, and we perpetuate it now, cos it’s 
dead, that word is dead. (Pryor, 1982) 
 
Although the extract may contain an element of hyperbole designed for performance 
affect, from this point on Pryor’s use of the word diminished. Pryor’s description of 
the word as ‘dead’ matches Roland Barthes’ comments on denotive signification 
(1977: 44), that it is the truly traumatic signs that become fixed and deny connotation. 
If words are ‘alive’ to connotation, it is the purely denotive sign that is ‘dead’, that no 
longer moves. Although the meaning of ‘nigga’ has variation from context to context, 
it would seem that while not denying connotation absolutely, because ‘nigger’ is so 
denotive of racism, the connotations of ‘nigga’ are often reduced and can easily revert 
to the earlier meaning. It therefore remains problematic when placed in rhetorical 
humorous structures, something that Pryor realized when his own context of thought 
shifted during his visit to Africa. It is the denotive specificity of ‘nigger’ that prevents 
the use of ‘nigga’ being a reliable element of resistance or reversed discourse. 
 
Conclusion 
Humour and comedy are not often the focus of discussions of race, ethnicity and 
racism, yet black comedians have a long history of critiquing and resisting racism 
through their performance. Sociologists have probably ignored this topic because it 
forms non-serious discourse, outside of the traditional boundaries of the subject. I 
have shown that resistance humour is structured through devices rhetorical in nature, 
and as rhetoric is the art of convincing, these performances have a paradoxical 
seriousness that runs throughout them. The article defined reverse discourse by 
explaining its historical context and connecting the idea to studies that examine 
humour as a means of resisting dominant power relations. In line with this, I outlined 
how contemporary black comedians reproduce stereotypes, first from embodied 
racism and then from cultural racism, in order to produce resistance meaning. The 
central observation is an understanding of the polysemicity of this humour, and, from 
this, a consideration that reversal is never automatically ‘successful’. In fact, reversal 
humour throws into doubt the very notion of ‘success’ in humour. As humour 
increases its structural polysemia through the material of reversal, ambiguity 
increases, fixed meaning becomes more unlikely to appear and the potential for 
multifarious political and ethical interpretations map themselves onto the socio-
linguistic space. Revered humour is complex, multilayered and, while a key point of 
anti-racist critique, not always successful. While the humour of black comedians is 
important and often crucial for the explosion of stereotypes and expression of anti-
racism, we should not forget that such discourse is always incongruous in its structure 
and thus ambiguous and double-edged in its outcome. 
 
Appendix One 
Berger’s (1995: 54–5) list of 45 humour techniques. 
 
Technique    Category 
1. Absurdity    Logic 
2. Accident    Logic 
3. Allusion    Language 
4. Analogy    Logic 
5. Before/After   Identity 
6. Bombast    Language 
7. Burlesque    Identity 
8. Caricature    Identity 
9. Catalogue    Logic 
10. Chase Scene   Visual 
11. Coincidence   Logic 
12. Comparison   Logic 
13. Definition    Language 
14. Disappointment   Logic 
15. Eccentricity   Identity 
16. Embarrassment   Identity 
17. Exaggeration   Language 
18. Exposure    Identity 
19. Facetiousness  Language 
20. Grotesque    Identity 
21. Ignorance    Logic 
22. Imitation    Identity 
23. Impersonation   Identity 
24. Infantilism   Language 
25. Insults    Language 
26. Irony    Language 
27. Literalness   Language 
28. Mimicry    Identity 
29. Mistakes    Logic 
30. Misunderstanding  Language 
31. Parody    Identity 
32. Puns, Wordplay   Language 
33. Repartee, Outwitting Language 
34. Repetition, Pattern  Logic 
35. Reversal    Logic 
36. Ridicule    Logic 
37. Rigidity    Logic 
38. Sarcasm    Language 
39. Satire    Language 
40. Scale, Size   Identity 
41. Slapstick    Visual 
42. Speed    Visual 
43. Stereotypes   Identity 
44. Theme and Variation  Logic 
45. Unmasking   Identity 
 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their perceptive comments on 
the article. Thanks also to Gregor McLennan and Thomas Osborne, for helpful 
guidance on an earlier version. My current research is funded by an ESRC 
Postdoctoral Fellowship (PTA-026–27–2168). 
 
References 
Attardo, S. (1994) Linguistic Theories of Humor. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Back, L. (1996) New Ethnicities and Urban Culture. Racisms and Multiculture in 
Young Lives. London: UCL Press. 
Balibar, E. (1991) ‘Is there a “Neo-Racism”?’, in E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein (eds) 
Race, Nation, Class. Ambiguous Identities, pp. 17–28. London: Verso. 
Barker, M. (1981) The New Racism. Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe. 
London: Junction Books. 
Barthes, R. (1977) ‘Rhetoric of the Image’, in Image, Music, Text, pp. 32–51. 
London: Fontana Press. 
Bateson, G. (1972) ‘A Theory of Play and Fantasy’, in Steps to an Ecology of the 
Mind, pp. 177–93. New Jersey: Jason Aronson. 
Bauman, Z. (1991) Modernity and Ambivalence. Cambridge: Polity. 
Benton, G. (1988) ‘The Origin of the Political Joke’, in C. Powell and G.E.C. Paton 
(eds) Humour in Society. Resistance and Control, pp. 33–55. London: Macmillan.  
Berger, A.A. (1995) Blind Men and Elephants. Perspectives on Humor. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
Berger, A.A. (1998) An Anatomy of Humor. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
Bergson, H. (1911) Laughter. An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. C. 
Brereton and F. Rothwell. Kobenhan: Green Integer. 
Billig, M. (2005) ‘Comic Racism and Violence’, in S. Lockyer and M. Pickering (eds) 
Beyond a Joke. The Limits of Humour, pp. 25–44. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bryant, C. (2006) ‘The Language of Resistance? Czech Jokes and Joke-telling under 
Nazi Occupation, 1943–45’, Journal of Contemporary History 41(1): 133–51. 
Cantwell, R. (1992) Bluegrass Breakdown. The Making of the Old Southern Sound. 
New York: De Capo Press. 
Cook, W. (2004) ‘The Time of his Life’, The Guardian, Monday 7 June, URL 
(consulted February 2006): http://www.guardian.co.uk/arts/columns/laughingmatters/ 
story/0,,1229891,00.html 
Dundes, A. and T. Hauschild (1988) ‘Auschwitz Jokes’, in C. Powell and G.E.C. 
Paton (eds) Humour in Society. Resistance and Control, pp. 56–66. London: 
Macmillan. 
Eco, U. (1986) ‘The Comic and the Rule’, in Travels in Hyperreality, pp. 269–78. 
San Diego, CA: Harcourt. 
Fanon, F. (1967) Towards the African Revolution, trans. H. Chevalier. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
Fuller, K. (1983a) ‘P.C. Ganja’, on Three of a Kind, starring Lenny Henry, Tracy 
Ullman and David Copperfield. BBC records, distributed by PRT Records Ltd. 
Fuller, K. (1983b) ‘Delbert’, on Three of a Kind, starring Lenny Henry, Tracy 
Ullman and David Copperfield. BBC records, distributed by PRT Records Ltd. 
Gibbons, F. (2003) ‘Sexist and Racist but Certainly not Surreal’, The Guardian, 
Thursday 14 August. 
Gurevich, A. (1997) ‘Bakhtin and his Theory of Carnival’, in J. Bremmer and H. 
Roodenburg (eds) A Cultural History of Humour from Antiquity to the Present Day, 
pp 54–60. Cambridge: Polity. 
Hartigan Jr., J. (1999) Racial Situations. Class Predicaments of Whiteness in Detroit. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Henry, L. and K. Fuller (1989) Lenny Live and Unleashed. Palace/Sleeping Partners 
Production. 
Henry, L. and K. Fuller (1994) Live and Loud Tour 1994. On The Box Productions in 
association with Critical Films. 
Hewitt, R. (1986) White Talk Black Talk. Inter-racial Friendships and 
Communication amongst Adolescents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hunter, R.D. (2005) ‘American Bullshit’, a video extract from White Woman, URL  
(consulted March 2006): http://www.reginalddhunter.co.uk/video/ 
Linstead, S. (1988) ‘“Jokers Wild”’: Humour in Organisational Culture’, in C. Powell 
and G.E.C. Paton (eds) Humour in Society. Resistance and Control, pp. 123–48. 
London: Macmillan. 
Logan, B. (2005) ‘Reginald D. Hunter, The Venue, London’, The Guardian, URL 
(consulted March 2006): http://arts.guardian.co.uk/reviews/story/0,,1463795,00.html 
Malik, S. (2002) Representing Black Britain, Black and Asian Images on Television. 
London: Sage. 
Modood, T. (1997) ‘“Difference”, Cultural Racism and Anti-racism’, in P. Werbner 
and T. Modood (eds) Debating Cultural Hybridity, Multi-cultural Identities and the 
Politics of Anti-racism, pp. 154–72. London: Zed Books.  
Modood, T. (2005) ‘Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7’, Open Democracy, URL 
(consulted October 2005): http://www.opendem ocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/ 
multiculturalism_2879.jsp  
Pryor, R. (1982) Live on Sunset Strip. Warner Bros. 
Pryor, R. (2004[1971]) Live and Smokin’. Revolver Entertainment. 
Rampton, J. (2005) ‘Going Out. Comedy. Reginald D. Hunter’, Preview, The 
Independent, Saturday 17 September, p. 13. 
Rock, C. (1996) Bring the Pain. HBO and Dreamworks. 
Rock, C. and N. George (1996) ‘Interview: Chris Rock on “Bring the Pain”’, on C. 
Rock, Bring the Pain. An HBO special. Dreamworks.  
Rodrigues, S.B. and D.L. Collinson (1995) ‘“Having Fun”? Humour as Resistance in 
Brazil’, Organisation Studies 16(5): 739–68. 
Sotiropoulos, K. (2006) Staging Race. Black Performers in Turn of the Century 
America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
St Louis, B. (2003) ‘Sport, Genetics, and the “Natural Athlete”: The Resurgence of 
Racial Science’, Body and Society 9(2): 75–92. 
Stokker, K. (2001) ‘Quisling Humor in Hitler’s Norway: Its Wartime Function and 
Postwar Legacy’, Humor 14(4): 339–57.  
Sullivan, C. (2005) ‘Death? #@%! that’, The Independent, Wednesday 27 April, 
pp. 36–7. 
Weaver, S. (2007) ‘Humour, Rhetoric and Racism. A Sociological Critique of Racist 
Humour’, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Bristol. 
 
Simon Weaver is an ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Social Science 
at Loughborough University. His current research interests focus on humour and 
rhetoric, and representations of racist and offensive humour in the media. Address: 
Brockington Building, Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, 
Loughborough, Leicestershire LE11 3TU, UK. E-mail: 
simon_weaver99@hotmail.com 
 
